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abstract: In health insurance, a reimbursement mechanism refers to a method of third-party repayment to 
offset the use of medical services and equipment. This systematic review aimed to identify challenges and adverse 
outcomes generated by the implementation of reimbursement mechanisms based on the diagnosis-related group 
(DRG) classification system. All articles published between 1983 and 2017 and indexed in various databases were 
reviewed. Of the 1,475 articles identified, 36 were relevant and were included in the analysis. Overall, the most 
frequent challenges were increased costs (especially for severe diseases and specialised services), a lack of adequate 
supervision and technical infrastructure and the complexity of the method. Adverse outcomes included reduced 
length of patient stay, early patient discharge, decreased admissions, increased re-admissions and reduced services. 
Moreover, DRG-based reimbursement mechanisms often resulted in the referral of patients to other institutions, 
thus transferring costs to other sectors.
Keywords: Health Insurance; Third-Party Payments; Reimbursement Mechanisms; Diagnosis-Related Groups; 
Quality of Health Care; Patient Outcome Assessment; Systematic Review.
امللخ�ص: يف نظام �لتاأمني �ل�سحي، ت�سري �آلية �ل�سد�د �إىل طريقة �ل�سد�د لطرف ثالث لتعوي�ض ��ستخد�م �خلدمات و�ملعد�ت �لطبية. تهدف 
هذه �ملر�جعة �ملنهجية �إىل حتديد �لتحديات و�لنتائج �ل�سلبية �لناجتة عن تنفيذ �آليات �ل�سد�د على �أ�سا�ض نظام ت�سنيف �ملجموعة �ملرتبطة 
بالت�سخي�ض. متت مر�جعة جميع �ملقاالت �ملن�سورة بني عامي 1983 و 2017 و�ملفهر�سة يف قو�عد �لبيانات �ملختلفة. من بني 1,475 مقالة 
مت حتديدها، كانت 36 مقالة ذ�ت �سلة ومت ت�سمينها يف �لتحليل. ب�سكل عام، كانت �لتحديات �الأكرث �سيوًعا هي �لتكاليف �ملتز�يدة )خا�سة 
�لنتائج  �سملت  �لطريقة.  وتعقيد  �لتقنية  �لتحتية  و�لبنية  �ملنا�سب  �الإ�رش�ف  ونق�ض  �ملتخ�س�سة(،  و�خلدمات  �ل�سديدة  للأمر��ض  بالن�سبة 
�ل�سلبية تقليل مدة �إقامة �ملري�ض، و�خلروج �ملبكر للمري�ض، و�نخفا�ض معدل �الإدخال، وزيادة حاالت �إعادة �الإدخال وتقليل �خلدمات. 
علوة على ذلك، غالًبا ما �أدت �آليات �ل�سد�د �مل�ستندة �إىل �ملجموعة �ملرتبطة بالت�سخي�ض �إىل �إحالة �ملر�سى �إىل موؤ�س�سات �أخرى، وبالتايل 
حتويل �لتكاليف �إىل قطاعات �أخرى.
الكلمات املفتاحية: �لتاأمني �ل�سحي؛ مدفوعات �لطرف �لثالث؛ �آليات �ل�سد�د؛ �ملجموعات ذ�ت �ل�سلة بالت�سخي�ض؛ جودة �لرعاية �ل�سحية؛ تقييم 
نتائج �ملري�ض؛ مر�جعة منهجية.
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The diagnosis-related group (drg) classif- ication system is a method of categorising patients for health insurance purposes in 
order to control costs and facilitate repayment by third 
party providers for the use of medical services and 
equipment.1 Using this system, patients are classified 
according to a range of variables, including primary 
and secondary diagnoses, age, gender, the presence of 
comorbidities/complications and treatment(s) prov- 
ided. The intention behind this type of system is to 
classify patients into a limited number of groups 
in order to form clinically meaningful yet relatively 
homogeneous resource consumption patterns.2 A 
DRG-based reimbursement mechanism was first 
introduced in the USA in 1983 as a component of the 
Medicare programme, before being adopted by other 
countries around the world soon thereafter.3
Although the primary goals of DRG-based reim- 
bursement mechanisms vary worldwide, most aim 
to increase transparency and efficiency, especially in 
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European countries.4–6 Indeed, increasing transparency, 
providing effective care, controlling costs and impr- 
oving the quality of care are some of the advantages 
reported for this method of reimbursement in hospital 
settings.7 However, this type of system is also subject 
to various challenges and adverse outcomes, for 
instance by unintentionally encouraging hospitals to 
preferentially admit more cost-effective patients.8 It 
has also been claimed that this type of payment system 
inspires a shift from traditional inpatient to outpatient 
care as a cost-saving measure.9
Researchers have previously evaluated the effects 
of implementing DRG-based repayment systems.10 
However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, 
none have yet sought to systematically evaluate the 
challenges and potential negative effects of this type 
of system. Therefore, the objective of this article was 
to systematically review the challenges and adverse 
outcomes generated by the implementation of DRG-
based reimbursement mechanisms.
Methods
This systematic review was conducted in line with the 
Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and 
Meta-Analysis guidelines.11 A literature search was 
conducted to identify all English-language articles 
assessing the challenges and adverse outcomes of DRG- 
based reimbursement mechanisms published between 
January 1983 and February 2017 and indexed in the 
Scopus® (Elsevier, Amsterdam, the Netherlands), 
MEDLINE® (National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, 
Maryland, USA) or Embase® (Elsevier) databases. 
Search terms related to challenges and DRG-
based reimbursement mechanisms were combined 
using Boolean operators (i.e. “challenge”, “barrier”, 
“problem”, “difficulty”, “disadvantage” OR “weakness” 
AND “DRG”, “diagnosis-related groups”, “case-mix” 
OR “case mix”) in order to identify relevant articles in 
which these terms appeared in the publication title, 
keywords and/or abstract. Following the literature 
search, identified articles were reviewed and the 
abstracts assessed by two evaluators to determine 
if they were fit for inclusion in the analysis. In cases 
of inter-evaluator disagreement, the full text of the 
articles was assessed in order to come to a consensus. 
Articles were selected for further full-text review if 
they explored the challenges and adverse outcomes 
generated by the implementation of a DRG-based 
reimbursement mechanism. 
All types of articles except reviews and letter 
to editors were included in the analysis. Articles 
focusing on other mechanisms of reimbursement, 
such as fee-for-service or global budget systems, 
were excluded. In addition, articles focusing on the 
measurement, calculation, development and structure 
of the mechanism and those solely examining 
positive or beneficial outcomes were also excluded. 
Subsequently, the studies were assessed to determine 
their quality based on criteria proposed by Kmet 
et al.12 Depending on the design of the study, two 
evaluators independently ranked the studies using 
different sets of criteria for qualitative and quantitative 
studies. Any disagreements were discussed until a 
consensus was reached. Implementation challenges 
were categorised as either leadership-related, 
managerial, organisational, technical or personnel-
related according to a previously described template.13 
Adverse outcomes were classified as per the model 
developed by Fourie et al.9
Overall, a total of 1,475 articles were identified 
during the literature search, of which 343 were 
duplicates. After reviewing the titles and abstracts, 892 
non-relevant articles were also excluded. Subsequently, 
240 articles underwent further full-text review; of 
these, 55 articles were excluded due to lack of access to 
the full text, 75 articles were review articles or letters 
to the editor and 44 were written in languages other 
than English. Furthermore, 29 articles were removed 
due to their lack of relevance and one qualitative 
article was excluded due to its low quality (i.e. a quality 
score of <50%). The final analysis therefore included 36 
articles [Figure 1].
A standardised data collection form was 
developed and completed by two researchers. The 
data collected included bibliographic information, 
the study setting, the country in which the study 
was performed and any challenges and adverse 
 
Figure 1: Flowchart showing the search strategy used to 
identify articles for inclusion in the systematic review.
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Table 1: Quality analysis* of studies assessing the implementation of reimbursement mechanisms based on the diagnosis-related group classification 
system14–49
Criteria Score
















Study design evident and 
appropriate?












Context for the study clear? N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Connection to a theoretical 
framework/wider body of knowledge?
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Sampling strategy described, relevant 
and justified?
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 N/A 2 2 2 2 2
Data collection methods clearly 
described and systematic?
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Data analysis clearly described and 
systematic?
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Use of verification procedure(s) to 
establish credibility?
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 1 2 0 2 2
Reflexivity accounted for? N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Method of subject/comparison group 
selection or source of information/
input variables described and 
appropriate?
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 N/A N/A N/A 2 2 2 2
Subject (and comparison group, if 
applicable) characteristics sufficiently 
described?
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 N/A N/A N/A 2 2 2 2
If interventional and random 
allocation was possible, was it 
described?
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
If interventional and blinding of 
investigators was possible, was it 
reported?
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
If interventional and blinding 
of subjects was possible, was it 
reported?
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Outcome and (if applicable) exposure 
measure(s) well-defined and robust 
for measurement/misclassification 
bias? Means of assessment reported?
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 N/A N/A N/A 2 2 2 2
Sample size appropriate? N/A N/A 2 1 2 N/A 2 1 N/A N/A N/A 2 2 1 N/A N/A N/A 2 2 N/A N/A
Analytic methods described/justified 
and appropriate?
2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 N/A N/A N/A 2 2 2 2
Some estimate of variance is reported 
for the main results?
2 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 1 2 1 N/A N/A N/A 2 0 2 0
Controlled for confounding? N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 0 1 1 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0 0 N/A
Results reported in sufficient detail? 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 N/A N/A N/A 2 2 2 2
Conclusions supported by the 
results?






















































N/A = not applicable.  *As per criteria adapted from Kmet et al.12 Each criterion was assessed based on compliance, with scores of zero indicating no, 1 indicating partial compliance and 
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outcomes identified regarding the implementation 
of DRG-based reimbursement mechanisms. In cases 
of disagreement, a third researcher was contacted to 
provide the deciding vote. Data analysis was performed 
using an Excel spreadsheet, Version 2013 (Microsoft 
Corp., Redmond, Washington, USA). The results were 
presented using descriptive statistics.
Results
A total of 36 articles assessing the challenges and 
adverse outcomes of DRG-based reimbursement 
mechanisms were included in the final analysis.14–49 Of 
these, the majority (n = 28; 77.8%) were published in 
1990 or before.15–21,23,24,27–29,31,34,35,37–46,48,49 Most studies 
(n = 31; 86.1%) were set in the USA.15–24,28–46,48,49 Data 
collection strategies included observation (n = 2; 5.6%), 
in-person (n = 4; 11.1%) or telephone (n = 2; 5.6%) 
interviews, paper-based (n = 2; 5.6%) or electronic (n 
= 1; 2.8%) questionnaires, checklists (n = 1; 2.8%) and 
reviews of patient/hospital records (n = 26; 72.2%), 
annual reports (n = 8; 22.2%) and transcripts (n = 1; 
2.8%).14–49 
Almost two-thirds (n = 23; 63.9%) of the studies 
were set in hospitals, with the rest set in medical 
centres (n = 6; 16.7%), nursing homes (n = 2; 5.6%), 
trauma centres (n = 2; 5.6%), home health agencies (n 
= 2; 5.6%) or rehabilitation centres (n = 1; 2.8%).14–49 
A total of 29 studies (80.6%) were quantitative in 
nature.14–17,19,21–24,26–28,31,32,34–40,42–49 In addition, there 
were three qualitative (8.3%) and four mixed-method 
(11.1%) studies.18,20,25,29,30,33,41 In terms of quality 
assessment, qualitative, quantitative and mixed-
method studies received scores of >70%, >80% and 
>85%, respectively; however, quantitative studies were 
generally higher in quality compared to qualitative and 
mixed-method studies [Table 1].14–49
Table 2 summarises the studies which ident- 
ified challenges in the implementation of DRG-based 
reimbursement mechanisms.25–49 Overall, 15 studies 
(41.7%) reported managerial challenges.25,30,32,34–36,38–40, 
42–47 Of these, 12 (80%) indicated that DRG-based 
reimbursement mechanisms were not suitable for 
certain services due to the high cost involved and the 
likelihood of financial loss, including skin care, trauma, 
fibrocystic disease, heart surgery, rare diseases, 
urology disorders, mental disorders, intensive care and 
the care of elderly and paediatric patients.34–36,38–40,42–47 
The remaining three studies (20%) reported delayed 
reimbursement of hospital fees, increased expenses 
in educational hospitals (especially at baseline and in 
rural areas), poor medical recordkeeping and a lack of 
coding rules and standards.25,30,32
Two studies (5.6%) examined organisation 
environment challenges, including poor compliance 
with guidelines, the misfiling and potential loss of 
patients records and physicians being pressured 
to discharge patients prematurely.25,33 Technical 
challenges were reported by nine studies (25%), 
particularly data coding and misclassification issues 
and DRG creeping (i.e. upgrading or upcoding 
patients).25–28,31,32,37,42,47 Personnel-related challenges 
were also reported by eight studies (22%); of these, 
one of the most important was a lack of familiarity 
among physicians with the DRG classification system 
and misconceptions regarding the objectives of the 
mechanism.25,29,30,33,34,41,42,48,49 No leadership challenges 
were reported by any of the studies.
Studies assessing adverse outcomes resulting from 
the implementation of DRG-based reimbursement 
mechanisms are described in Table 3.14–24,32–49 
Overall, 11 studies (30.6%) examined the rate of early 
discharge, all of which noted an increase following 
implementation of the mechanism.15,17–20,22,23,33,41,47,48 
The motivation for this was due to awareness on the 
part of both physicians and hospital administrators 
of patients’ costs and the desire to reduce the length 
of hospital stay and increase efficiency. Five studies 
(13.9%) evaluated readmission rates; of these, four 
(80%) observed that the implementation of DRG-based 
reimbursement mechanisms resulted in increased re-
admission due to the low quality of services provided 
initially and premature discharge.14,19,22,23 In contrast, 
the remaining study revealed no change in the rate of 
re-admission.17
Nine studies (25%) measured length of patient 
stay.14,16,17,19,22–24,37,38 The majority (n = 8; 88.9%) 
found that the duration of hospital stay was reduced 
following the implementation of DRG-based reim- 
bursement mechanisms; reasons for this included 
preserving resources, reducing costs and improving 
efficiency.14,17,19,22–24,37,38 Only one indicated that the 
average length of stay increased.16 Two studies (5.6%) 
examined the number of services provided to patients; 
in the first, there was no change in the number of 
services provided to patients after implementation 
of the reimbursement mechanism, while the second 
found that access to certain services or technologies was 
restricted after implementation of the reimbursement 
mechanism since the system increased performance 
monitoring.17,23
Mortality rate was assessed as an outcome in 
four studies (11.1%).14,15,20,23 One study showed that the 
mortality rate increased following implementation of a 
DRG-based reimbursement mechanism.20 In contrast, 
two studies showed a reduction in mortality rate.14,23 
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Table 2: Challenges in the implementation of reimbursement mechanisms based on the diagnosis-related group classification system25–49
Author and 
year of study
Setting Type of study Type of challenges




et al.25 (2012) 
Ghana Mixed-method • Delays in 
reimbursement
• Poor compliance 
with guidelines 
• Inadequate filing 
system
• Classification problems • Severe personnel shortage 
• Lack of familiarity with 
DRG among physicians
Roeder et al.26 
(2001)
Germany Quantitative N/A N/A • DRG variants differed in 
degree and detail 
• Questionable grouping 
of cases 






UK Quantitative N/A N/A • Irregularities in diagnostic 
and operative coding 
• Inaccuracies in diagnostic 
coding
N/A
Horn et al.28 
(1985)





USA Qualitative N/A N/A N/A • Lack of familiarity with 
DRG among physicians 
• Misconceptions regarding 
DRG among physicians
Bray et al.30 
(1994)
USA Mixed-method • Increased costs per 
discharge in rural 
hospitals
N/A N/A • Less effort made by 
physicians to improve 





USA Quantitative N/A N/A • Lack of sensitivity 
to different types of 
procedures
N/A
Zhan et al.32 
(2007)
USA Quantitative • Low-quality medical 
recordkeeping 
• Lack of rules and 
standards for coding





USA Qualitative N/A • Pressure on doctors 
to discharge patients 
prematurely
N/A • Reduction of nurses and 
other support staff
Muñoz et al.34 
(1989)
USA Quantitative • Financial loss N/A N/A • Refusal to admit patients
Muñoz et al.35 
(1988)
USA Quantitative • Financial loss N/A N/A N/A
Zwanziger et 
al.36 (1991)
USA Quantitative • Financial loss N/A N/A N/A
Vollertsen et 
al.37 (1988)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A • Classification problems • 
DRG creeping
N/A
Horn et al.38 
(1986)
USA Quantitative • Financial loss N/A N/A N/A
Thomas et 
al.39 (1988)
USA Quantitative • Financial loss N/A N/A N/A
Pasternak et 
al.40 (1986)
USA Quantitative • Financial loss N/A N/A N/A
Bull41 (1988) USA Qualitative N/A N/A N/A • Guiding patients to 
outpatient departments 
Joy and Yurt42 
(1990)
USA Quantitative • Financial loss N/A • Failure to account for 
illness severity
N/A
Muñoz et al.43 
(1988)
USA Quantitative • Financial loss N/A N/A N/A
Munoz et al.44 
(1989)
USA Quantitative • Financial loss N/A N/A N/A
Munoz et al.45 
(1989)
USA Quantitative • Financial loss N/A N/A N/A
Muñoz et al.46 
(1989)
USA Quantitative • Financial loss N/A N/A N/A
N/A = not available; DRG = diagnosis-related group.
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However, none of these studies reported a significant 
link between this outcome and the reimbursement 
mechanism. No change in mortality rate was observed 
in the final study.15 Nine studies (25%) evaluated the 
number of admissions.14,15,18,23,33,34,38,42,49 Of these, all 
but one (n = 8; 88.9%) indicated that the admission 
rate was reduced following implementation of 
the DRG-based reimbursement mechanisms in 
order to preserve resources.14,15,23,33,34,38,42,49 Hospital 
efficiency was assessed as an outcome in 14 studies 
(38.9%), all of which observed an increase in 
inefficiency.16,32,34–36,38–40,42–49
A total of 13 studies (36%) examined the impact 
of the reimbursement methods on transferring costs 
by directing patients to other healthcare institutions or 
centres.14,15,17–24,35,37,41 Only one of these indicated that 
implementation of the reimbursement mechanism did 
not lead to the transfer of costs to other institutions.14 
The other studies found that patient costs were often 
transferred to other institutions in order to help reduce 
costs, especially for patients requiring rehabilitation 
services and those ≥65 years old. In particular, patients 
were often transferred to nursing homes or nursing 
care centres (n = 6; 46.2%), outpatient departments (n 
= 3; 23.1%), non-therapeutic sections (n = 1; 7.7%) and 
home-based services (n = 1; 7.7%).15,17–24,35,37,41
Discussion
Prospective reimbursement mechanisms, particularly 
those based on the DRG classification system, are usually 
implemented by healthcare policymakers in order to 
improve efficiency, ensure the optimal allocation of 
resources and control costs.50,51 Such mechanisms are 
also viewed favourably by insurance agencies as they 
allow for the distribution of financial risk between 
customers and service providers.52 However, the 
current review indicated that the implementation of 
these systems can be subject to various challenges, 
the most important of which was increased costs, 
especially for patients with severe diseases and those 
requiring specialised services.34–36,38–40,42–47 Other 
challenges included the failure to follow necessary 
guidelines, inadequate supervision, poor knowledge 
of the system among healthcare personnel (especially 
physicians and nurses), lack of technical infrastructure 
and the complexity of the method in question.25–27,29,32
Several studies noted that DRG-based 
reimbursement mechanisms failed to appropriately 
calculate disease severity and the cost of certain 
services.28,42,47 According to Leister and Stausberg, 
neglecting to consider disease risk and appropriate 
diagnostic classifications based on disease severity 
can cause hospitals to lose valuable resources when 
delivering care to high-risk patients and those with 
severe illnesses.53 In such cases, hospitals utilising 
these systems may choose not to admit such patients 
or to discharge them earlier in order to increase 
efficiency and cut costs. As such, DRG classification 
systems should be set up based on the number, type 
and severity of disease in each case and allow users to 
modify the assigned group based on these factors; this 
would ensure the more equitable calculation of fees 
and improve accessibility to healthcare and the quality 
of services rendered.28,34,35
Roeder et al. deemed the establishment of 
standard DRG units and different types of DRGs to 
be especially challenging.26 Another systematic review 
similarly highlighted this to be a major hindrance to 
the implementation of DRG-based reimbursement 
mechanisms in mainland China.54 Variations in the 
lifestyles and types of patients attending hospitals 
in different geographical regions can often result 
in differences in treatment patterns, medical costs, 
demand for services and the overall burden of disease. 
These represent major barriers to the data collection 
necessary to establish appropriate classification 
groups that reflect the actual economic and clinical 
situation.54 However, only one of the studies included 
in the current review referred to this problem.36
Other studies highlighted various organisational 
and technical challenges related to DRG-based 
Table 2 (cont’d): Challenges in the implementation of reimbursement mechanisms based on the diagnosis-related group classification system25–49
Author and 
year of study
Setting Type of study Type of challenges
Management process Organisation 
environment
Technical systems Personnel
Patel48 (1988) USA Quantitative N/A N/A N/A • Early discharge of patients 
• Restricted access 
to certain products, 
technologies and services





USA Quantitative N/A N/A N/A • Motivation among 
surgeons for patient 
selection
N/A = not available; DRG = diagnosis-related group.
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Setting Type of study Outcome















Efficiency Transfer of 
costs
Busato and von 
Below14 (2010)
Switzerland Quantitative N/A Increased Decreased N/A Decreased Decreased N/A No effect
Rogers et al.15 
(1990)
USA Quantitative Increased N/A N/A N/A No effect No effect N/A Increased
Vulgaropulos et 
al.16 (1990)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A Increased N/A N/A N/A Inefficient N/A
Evans et al.17 
(1990)






Increased N/A N/A N/A N/A Decreased N/A Increased
Tresch et al.19 
(1988)
USA Quantitative Increased Increased Decreased N/A N/A N/A N/A Increased
Lyles20 (1986) USA Mixed-method Increased N/A N/A N/A Increased N/A N/A Increased
Hurley et al.21 
(1990)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Increased
Menke et al.22 
(1998)




USA Quantitative Increased Increased Decreased N/A Decreased Decreased N/A Increased
Morrisey et al.24 
(1988)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A Decreased N/A N/A N/A N/A Increased
Zhan et al.32 
(2007)




USA Qualitative Increased N/A N/A N/A N/A Decreased N/A N/A
Muñoz et al.34 
(1989)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Decreased Inefficient N/A
Muñoz et al.35 
(1988)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Decreased Inefficient Increased
Zwanziger et 
al.36 (1991)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Inefficient N/A
Vollertsen et 
al.37 (1988)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A Decreased N/A N/A N/A N/A Increased
Horn et al.38 
(1986)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A Decreased N/A N/A Decreased Inefficient N/A
Thomas et al.39 
(1988)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Inefficient N/A
Pasternak et 
al.40 (1986)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Inefficient N/A
Bull41 (1988) USA Qualitative Increased N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Increased
Joy and Yurt42 
(1990)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Inefficient N/A
Muñoz et al.43 
(1988)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Inefficient N/A
Munoz et al.44 
(1989)USA
Quantitative N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Inefficient N/A
Munoz et al.45 
(1989)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Inefficient N/A
Muñoz et al.46 
(1989)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Inefficient N/A
Hensen et al.47 
(2005)
Germany Quantitative Increased N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Inefficient N/A
Patel48 (1988) USA Quantitative Increased N/A N/A Decreased N/A N/A N/A N/A
Wolfe and 
Detmer49 (1988)
USA Quantitative N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Decreased N/A N/A
N/A = not available.
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reimbursement mechanisms, including inadequate 
filing systems, poor recordkeeping, the misclassification 
of diseases, irregularities in the coding of procedures 
and diagnoses and an overall lack of coding rules and 
standards.25–27,32 Indeed, some studies showed that 
classification problems led to the possibility of DRG 
creeping, which refers to a tendency to upgrade or 
upcode patients to allow for the hospital to receive 
higher reimbursements.32,37 In a study of 239 hospitals 
under the Medicare programme, Hsia et al. identified 
the rate of DRG coding errors to be 20.8%, of which 
61.7% significantly favoured the hospital.55 In order to 
avoid this problem, coding standards and rules should 
be established and enforced in every hospital to ensure 
the correct codes are utilised. 
Several studies in the current systematic review 
identified misconceptions among physicians and 
nurses regarding the DRG-based system, compounded 
by a lack of familiarity with the system.25,29 In some 
cases, healthcare personnel were uninterested in 
controlling costs.30 However, Wild et al. noted that 
sharing profits with physicians and encouraging them 
to help balance the budget would intensify conflict 
between physicians; moreover, they might feel torn 
between their commitments to providing the best care 
to the patient and controlling costs.7 
One of the studies included in the current 
review noted that the DRG-based reimbursement 
mechanism increased costs, particularly in the year 
of implementation and in rural healthcare settings 
and educational hospitals.30 This finding may be 
due to several reasons, including a larger number of 
patients with severe illness presenting to educational 
hospitals, the lack of involvement of the physicians 
in improving the hospital’s financial performance, 
poor financial management and primary productivity 
control processes.30 On the other hand, DRG-based 
reimbursement mechanisms were deemed unsuitable 
in certain circumstances by other studies due to the 
lack of appropriate moderators, resulting in financial 
loss for the institution.38–40
Although most DRG-based reimbursement 
systems are introduced as cost-controlling measures, 
this can lead to undesirable outcomes that can affect 
the quality of the health services provided.4,56,57 
This type of system results in a clear incentive for 
healthcare providers to preferentially admit patients 
with lower costs or restrict the provision of expensive 
services, leading to an unfair access to healthcare.58 
In particular, vulnerable patient groups such as the 
elderly, children, immigrants and those suffering from 
chronic illness, heart failure or multiple illnesses may 
be disproportionately affected.34,48,49 Hospitals should 
therefore commit to providing an equal level of care 
to all patients by monitoring the performance of 
physicians. Additionally, providing standard protocols 
and guidelines for clinical decision-making may also 
be helpful to ensure a set level of quality of care while 
still controlling costs. 
In the current review, DRG-based reimbursement 
systems also led to other alarming outcomes, such 
as reducing essential services and admissions, 
encouraging early discharge, reducing length of stay, 
increasing re-admission and transferring costs to 
other sectors by directing patients to other healthcare 
institutions.14–24,32–49 Other researchers have similarly 
shown that the implementation of this type of system 
often results in a reduction in length of stay in order 
to cut costs and improve hospital efficiency.54,59–61 In 
a two-year study conducted in the UK, Farrar et al. 
found that the length of stay among patients with 
pelvic fractures increased following implementation of 
a DRG-based reimbursement mechanism.62 Likewise, 
the implementation of such mechanisms have resulted 
in increased rates of early discharge and subsequent 
emergency visits.54,63–65 However, others noted no 
significant differences in readmission, mortality and 
admission rates following implementation of the 
system.60,66,67
It is as yet unfeasible to conclude that DRG-
based reimbursement mechanisms are directly linked 
to substantial changes in quality of care for various 
reasons. First, none of the studies included in the present 
review could unequivocally attribute care outcomes 
to the implementation of the system, particularly 
since long-term effects can only be determined over 
years or even decades. Therefore, continuous quality 
monitoring is crucial at all hospitals. Second, while 
certain measurable clinical indicators like mortality 
and infection rates are important indicators of quality 
of care, other indirect factors also play a large role, 
including determinants of nursing care, interaction 
time between patients and physicians and the level of 
training received by healthcare professionals. Third, 
observed changes in the quality of care may not be 
explicitly related to the reimbursement mechanism 
in question, but to other factors, such as competition 
between hospitals or increased transparency.
This research was subject to several limitations. 
First, the full text of some articles was not available due 
to the date of publication; furthermore, several more 
recent articles available on this topic were published in 
languages other than English. Second, the majority of 
the included studies were from high-income countries; 
therefore, developing countries were not adequately 
represented, a fact which may limit the generalisability 
of the results. Third, the number of search terms 
and databases may not have been sufficiently 
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comprehensive to retrieve all relevant articles on 
this topic. Finally, most studies retrieved during the 
literature search reported both positive and adverse 
outcomes of DRG-based reimbursement mechanisms, 
with few focusing on administrative challenges. Future 
research is recommended to evaluate administrative 
challenges generated by the implementation of DRG-
based reimbursement mechanisms, especially with 
regards to leadership.
Conclusion
Reimbursement mechanisms based on the DRG 
classification system are gradually replacing fee-for-
service systems in many countries. However, the 
implementation of such mechanisms can face certain 
challenges, such as a lack of familiarity with the system 
among physicians, poor medical recordkeeping and 
issues with data coding. Recommended solutions 
include revising DRG classifications based on 
disease complexity, severity and complications and 
the number and type of illnesses, establishing new 
DRGs for patients with severe diseases, establishing 
moderators for vulnerable patient groups and 
incorporating an increased budget for particularly 
unusual or complex cases. Moreover, hospitals should 
implement extensive training at different levels, ensure 
effective communication with physicians and develop 
standard protocols for clinical decision-making.
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